Some countries make money from geography.
Singapore built prosperity around its position on global trade routes. The Netherlands turned Rotterdam into one of the gateways to the European economy. The UAE transformed its location into an aviation, logistics and financial hub.
And then there is Armenia.
For decades, Armenia has been located between major markets without being able to fully capitalize on that location.
Closed borders. Conflict. No direct rail connection with two of its neighbors. Dependence on routes through Georgia and Iran. Expensive logistics.
For Armenian businesses, geography has rarely been an advantage.
More often, it has been an additional cost.
Now Armenia is being offered a fundamentally different model.
TRIPP — the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity — is intended to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through Armenian territory while potentially becoming part of a much larger transport architecture linking Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Turkey and Western markets.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has described the project as capable of opening a “new era” for Armenia's economy.
Perhaps it can.
But I am interested in a different question:
If goods, electricity, gas, data and capital begin moving through Armenia, how much of the value they generate will actually remain in Armenia?
Because being a transit country and being a prosperous transit country are two very different things.
We Have Been Looking at the Map the Wrong Way
Look at Armenia not simply as a small landlocked country.
Look at it as a point between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.
To the west lies Turkey and, beyond it, Europe.
To the east are Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.
To the south is Iran.
To the north is Georgia and access to Black Sea ports.
On paper, the location is remarkable.
In practice, it has barely functioned.
The World Bank has identified Armenia's landlocked position and its closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan among the constraints affecting the country's trade. Armenia's exports have also remained concentrated in terms of both products and destinations.
In other words, one of Armenia's fundamental economic weaknesses has never been entirely inside the country.
It has been around it.
If that reality is genuinely changing, the economic significance could be enormous.
But this is where the story becomes more complicated.
TRIPP Is Much More Than a Railway
Public discussion often reduces TRIPP to a line on a map.
That misses the point.
The published framework encompasses much more than rail transport. It includes roads, bridges, tunnels and terminals, as well as energy infrastructure, potential pipelines, telecommunications and fiber-optic connectivity.
The proposed TRIPP Development Company is expected to have the ability to develop, construct, operate and maintain infrastructure, establish special-purpose entities and generate revenue from these activities.
This makes the project considerably more interesting economically.
Because infrastructure in the 21st century is not simply a container crossing a border.
It is electricity moving between grids.
Data travelling through fiber-optic networks.
A shipment being processed in a logistics center.
A warehouse storing goods before distribution.
A bank financing a transaction.
An insurance company underwriting it.
A technology platform managing the logistics.
Hotels, restaurants, maintenance companies and customs brokers serving the people and businesses moving along the route.
The real money is not created when a truck simply drives across a country's territory.
It is created when an economy develops around that truck.
And That Is Where I See the Main Risk
Armenia could build an excellent railway and still remain a relatively poor transit territory.
If a train enters the country, travels several dozen kilometers and leaves, the economic impact is limited.
Yes, there will be transit revenue.
Yes, jobs will be created.
Yes, the government will receive some additional tax revenue.
But the real value of a logistics hub does not lie in the rails.
It lies around them.
Armenia needs logistics centers.
Warehouses.
Free economic zones.
Manufacturing facilities.
Data centers.
Maintenance operations.
Customs and financial services.
Export-oriented production located near the route.
Otherwise, Armenia could make a remarkable historical mistake:
opening one of the South Caucasus's most important routes to everyone except its own economy.
74% Versus 26%
There is another number that deserves serious attention.
Under the published framework, the U.S. side is expected initially to hold 74% of the TRIPP Development Company, while Armenia would hold 26%.
The initial development period is 49 years.
If the arrangement is subsequently extended for another 50 years, Armenia's ownership is expected to increase to 49%, without an additional capital contribution from Armenia.
Those percentages alone do not tell us whether the arrangement is advantageous or disadvantageous.
A foreign partner holding a controlling stake can make economic sense if it brings capital, technology, management expertise, international operators and sufficient commercial traffic.
Twenty-six percent of a highly successful infrastructure system can be worth considerably more than 100% of a project that is never built.
So the correct question is not simply:
“Why does Armenia have only 26%?”
The more important question is:
What exactly does Armenia receive for that 26%?
And even more importantly:
What kind of economy will Armenia build around that 26%?
Land Is Capital Too
Armenia's contribution cannot be measured only in cash.
According to the published framework, Armenia is expected to provide land-use rights within designated project areas, potentially contribute existing infrastructure assets, facilitate permitting and regulatory processes, and contribute to border and customs infrastructure.
Those are substantial assets.
Especially the land.
Money can be raised again.
Geography cannot.
If, 20 or 30 years from now, this route becomes part of a significant Eurasian trading network, the value of rights granted today may look very different.
That is why public discussion should not focus exclusively on equity percentages.
The revenue structure may matter even more.
Who receives the tariffs?
How are profits distributed?
Who finances capital expenditure?
Who bears commercial risk?
Who selects the operators?
How are concessions awarded?
What obligations exist to reinvest profits?
How much tax revenue remains in Armenia?
How extensively will Armenian companies participate in procurement and subcontracting?
That is where the real economics of TRIPP will be determined.
And What About Sovereignty?
This is understandably the most sensitive issue.
The published framework explicitly states that Armenia retains sovereignty and jurisdiction over the territory involved. Armenian border, customs and security authority is also preserved, while certain strategic decisions are expected to require mechanisms of mutual agreement.
That distinction matters.
But legal sovereignty and economic control are not always identical.
A country can retain its flag, borders and laws while still exercising limited influence over the commercial ecosystem if critical technology, financing, operators and cargo flows are controlled elsewhere.
That is why the argument over whether TRIPP should be called a “corridor” is gradually becoming less economically interesting.
The more important 21st-century question is:
Who controls the economics of the route?
The Most Valuable Part of TRIPP May Not Be the Railway
There is another dimension that I believe is being underestimated.
Energy.
The broader framework allows for energy infrastructure, while Armenian officials have also discussed the possibility of greater regional electricity connectivity.
Imagine the region ten years from now.
Armenia is connected through energy infrastructure with Georgia, Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Electricity can potentially be traded across several systems.
Armenia then stops being merely a territory crossed by containers.
It becomes an energy node.
Add fiber-optic infrastructure and another layer emerges:
Data.
Add the railway and there is a third:
Freight.
Only then does it become clear why TRIPP could potentially mean much more than several dozen kilometers of railway.
It is an attempt to change Armenia's economic function.
But Infrastructure Does Not Create Cargo by Itself
This is where I would be careful with excessive optimism.
A government can build a road.
It cannot order international businesses to use it.
A logistics company will choose the Armenian route only if it is competitive in price, speed, security and predictability.
Armenia will therefore be competing with other regional routes.
Routes through Georgia.
Routes through Iran.
Caspian connections.
Existing regional infrastructure.
Ultimately, glossy presentations will not determine the success of TRIPP.
The price and reliability of moving one container from point A to point B will.
That is what will decide whether this becomes a functioning international trade route or simply an ambitious infrastructure project.
Peace Must Become a Business Model Too
This, to me, is where the entire discussion becomes most important.
For decades, Armenia paid an economic price for conflict.
Through closed borders.
Military expenditure.
Restricted logistics.
Foregone investment.
A small and fragmented accessible market.
Now the government argues that peace can reopen the region.
Fine.
Then peace must learn to make money.
Not for politicians.
For the country.
If an Armenian manufacturer can deliver products to Europe more cheaply because regional connections have opened, that is a peace dividend.
If an investor builds a factory in Syunik because an international railway now passes nearby, that is a peace dividend.
If Goris, Kapan and Meghri gain logistics centers, hotels, factories and new jobs, that is a peace dividend.
If Armenia can become an electricity exporter or regional energy trader, that is a peace dividend.
But if none of those things happens and foreign cargo merely travels through Armenian territory, it may eventually become very difficult to explain to society why the project was described as historic.
Syunik Must Not Become a Place Everyone Simply Passes Through
For me, this is particularly important.
When discussing major international infrastructure projects, it is easy to talk about billions of dollars, Washington, Baku, Ankara and geopolitics.
And forget the person who actually lives beside the route.
If TRIPP is implemented, Syunik should become one of its principal economic beneficiaries.
Not an observer.
A beneficiary.
It should attract businesses.
Logistics centers.
Warehouses.
Services.
Education and training programs.
Engineering jobs.
Small and medium-sized enterprises.
Otherwise, Armenia could build 21st-century infrastructure through the region while leaving the regional economy standing beside it.
So I Would Not Ask Whether Armenia Needs TRIPP
That question is too simple.
If Armenia can genuinely acquire new railway connections, cheaper logistics, energy connectivity and access to larger international transport networks, the potential economic benefits are evident.
The World Bank has argued that deeper regional connectivity and normalization with Armenia's neighbors could support stronger growth. At the same time, Armenia continues to face structural constraints involving connectivity, competition, productivity and skills.
So my question is more difficult:
Is Armenia itself ready for TRIPP?
Do we have a development strategy for the territory surrounding the route?
Do we have a plan for attracting manufacturing?
Do we have credible estimates of future cargo volumes?
Do we have an energy strategy?
Are we preparing the specialists these projects will require?
Are Armenian companies being positioned to participate in this new economy rather than watch it from behind a fence?
And most importantly:
Do we know how much Armenia intends to earn from its new geography?
Because several years from now, arguing about who owns the road may be too late.
The question that must be answered now is who will own the economy around that road.
Geography May Finally Begin Working for Armenia
I do not see TRIPP as automatically either a victory or a threat.
At this stage, it is a project with considerable potential — and equally significant unanswered questions.
But for the first time in a long time, Armenia may have a genuine opportunity to change the economic meaning of its position on the map.
From a dead end into a route.
From the periphery into a connection point.
From a country that pays for difficult geography into a country that earns from it.
If that happens, Armenia's most valuable resource may turn out to be neither copper nor gold nor inexpensive labor.
It may be its location.
But geography alone has never made a country wealthy.
Prosperity comes from a state's ability to turn kilometers of infrastructure into businesses, investment, technology, jobs and domestic capital.
Armenia can indeed become a transit country.
But it will become a historic success only under one condition:
when we discover that it is not only other countries' goods that pass through Armenia — but that part of the money stays here as well.
By Lida Nalbandyan, Founder and CEO of Octopus Media Group