The 7–8 August meeting in Washington is not a protocol photo-op; it is a bid to lock in a new South Caucasus security order after 2020–2023. Artsakh has been effectively lost, Russia’s role has shrunk, Turkey and Azerbaijan have gained leverage, and the U.S./EU want to “close” the Armenia–Azerbaijan file with a deal that reduces war risk and secures transit routes.
Armenia is being offered “peace.” The question is on what terms and with which guarantees.
Five realistic document formats
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Joint Statement
Mutual recognition of territorial integrity (Alma-Ata 1991), launch of border delimitation, pledge to refrain from force.
Pro: low political cost. Con: weak enforceability. -
Non-Aggression / Incident-Prevention Protocol
Hotline, verified incident reports, bans on offensive deployments, international monitoring (observers/UAV/satellite).
Pro: reduces surprise attacks. Con: leaves core disputes unresolved. -
Framework Peace Agreement
Pillars:-
Delimitation by 1991 (or “1975”) maps;
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Opening communications strictly under Armenian sovereignty (no extraterritorial “corridor” in Syunik);
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POW/MIA exchange and amnesties;
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International guarantees (automatic penalties for non-compliance).
Pro: a roadmap. Con: may front-load Armenian concessions.
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Connectivity Package
Road/rail through Syunik with Armenian control, reciprocal infrastructure on the Azerbaijani side, multilateral financing, cargo insurance.
Pro: investment and logistics. Con: exposure if security terms are vague. -
Aid & Security MOU
Funding for infrastructure and borders, defense training, police/security reform; possibly U.S. side-letters warning of consequences for violations.
Pro: tangible resources. Con: political strings attached.
What to watch in the fine print
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Map baseline: “Alma-Ata 1991” vs. “1975” — crucial for border villages/segments.
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Syunik language: “route under Armenian sovereignty” vs. “corridor.” Any hint of extraterritoriality is a red line.
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Guarantee mechanics: Are there automatic consequences for breaches, and who triggers them?
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POW/MIA: Is a full exchange dated, listed, and verified?
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Monitoring: Who, where, for how long, with what mandate?
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Turkey link: Any de facto tie-in to Armenia–Turkey normalization?
Potential gains for Armenia
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De-escalation and predictability at the border;
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International guarantees with leverage on violators;
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Investment/aid (roads, energy, border tech, digital perimeter control);
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A Turkey track opening if sovereignty is preserved.
Key risks
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Legal closure on Artsakh inside the peace text — politically and morally painful.
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Syunik vulnerability if language is ambiguous.
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Asymmetric sequencing: Baku secures transit/recognitions now; security and amnesties drift.
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Iran/Russia backlash: economic and political pushback.
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Domestic polarization unless red lines and guarantees are explicit.
Four outcome scenarios
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Minimalist communiqué: soft language + working groups. Risk of drift.
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Balanced framework + monitoring: roadmap, observers, POW swap. Best if backed by hard guarantees.
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Asymmetric transit-first deal: connectivity prioritized, weak guarantees — risky for Syunik.
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No-deal breakdown: rising tension; potential incidents.
Armenia’s must-haves (realistic minimum)
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No extraterritoriality: all roads/rail under Armenian sovereignty, Armenian border control and inspection rights.
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POW/MIA: complete exchange, dated and verified.
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Automaticity of guarantees: link financing/projects to compliance; build in automatic penalties.
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Observers with teeth: public reporting and triggers for response.
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Technical annex: maps/coordinates to remove ambiguity.
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Turkey linkage as symmetry: any transit step matched by real moves by Ankara (border opening/cargo).
Conclusion
Washington offers both opportunity and risk. Paper peace matters only as guaranteed peace with timelines and automatic consequences. Armenia can secure greater safety and resources if it protects sovereignty in Syunik, nails down the POW/MIA exchange, and ties any benefits for Baku to verifiable compliance.
By Lida Nalbandyan, Founder and CEO of Octopus Media Group